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Despite the widespread use of the concept there is neither a consistent theoretical 
construction nor a clear definition of globalisation. Although the debate between pro 
and anti globalisation scholars and activists is interesting, it largely fails to address 
globalisation as a fundamental structural transformation of modern capitalism from a 
historical perspective and tends to reduce it to a re-articulation of the old debate on 
states versus markets. The first aim of this paper is to provide a clearer definition of 
globalisation  which  will  be  helpful  in  assessing  the  validity  of  various  arguments 
surrounding  the  concept  of  globalisation,  including  whether  such  a process exists. 
Then an alternative interpretation of globalisation viewed from a political economy 
perspective will be introduced. It will be argued that internationalisation in the form of 
increased trade and foreign direct investment is the nature of capitalist accumulation 
process, thus, cannot be impeded. This accumulation process necessarily creates its 
own  ideological  climate  to  facilitate  acceptance  of  the  doctrine  and  to  justify  the 
economic  and  social  problems  it  creates.  Finally  it  will  argue  that  there  is  a 
globalisation tendency since increased internationalisation inevitably weakens the role 
of nation states by transferring some of their functions to newly created supranational 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Globalisation, as a concept, means different things to different people. Despite the 
widespread use of the concept, apart from a common agreement on the tendency of 
economic  activity  to  expand  beyond  national  borders,  there  is  to  date  neither  a 
consistent theoretical construction nor a clear definition of globalisation. There is a 
very  interesting  debate  between  pro  and  anti  globalisation  scholars  and  activists. 
Although this debate is interesting, it largely fails due to a terminological confusion 
over  the  closely  connected  but  distinctive  concepts  of  globalisation, 
internationalisation  and  liberalisation,  which  are  often  used  interchangeably  and 
hastily.  The  confusion  results  from  the  lack  of  a  precise  definition.  One  can  read 
through this vast literature and often remain disorientated. The debate largely fails to 
address globalisation as a fundamental structural transformation of modern capitalism 
from  a  historical  perspective  and  tends  to  reduce  it  to  a re-articulation of the old 
debate on states versus markets. 
  An illustrative example comes from Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok 
Tong  who  said  ‘September  11  [...]  marks  the  conflict  between  globalisation  and 
isolationism, between free trade and protectionism’ (BBC, 2001). In his view, it is 
implied  that  if  one  is  against  globalisation  one  must  be  favouring  isolationism. 
Moreover globalisation is inaccurately associated with free trade and isolationism with 
protectionism. Such an unsophisticated approach to these concepts compels one to fall 
for such simplistic dichotomies that even the critics of globalisation willingly accept. 
In this confusion it is not uncommon for people to reject globalisation as a myth but 
characterize themselves as ‘anti-globalisation’ without realising the contradiction. 
  Moreover most of the arguments are rather descriptive, ‘portraying what is 
going on rather than a conceptual or theoretical attempt to explain why all these things 
are happening now and what to make out of all these changes’ (Khondker, 1994: 5). 
Globalisation is often seen as the totality of recent trends and events such as American 
hegemony,  distance  reducing  technological  changes,  economic  liberalisation  and 
internationalisation.  
In the absence of an accurate and commonly accepted definition, arguments for 
and against globalisation become obscure as writers define globalisation according to 
their ideological inspirations and what they intend to prove. In this sense globalisation   4 
is  an  ideological  term  and  like  all  ideological  terms  it  is  the  subject  of  great 
controversy. The ever-increasing literature on globalisation proves that, in the absence 
of a clear definition, we will never know whether globalisation is a ‘myth’ or a ‘fact’ 
as there is no agreement on what processes constitute globalisation. Thus globalisation 
will always be seen either as an ‘incontestable fact’ or as a ‘myth.’ 
  The first aim of this paper, therefore, is to clarify the distinction between the 
concepts of internationalisation, liberalisation and globalisation. Globalisation will be 
defined  as  ‘a  relative  decline  in  the  nation  state’s  role/power  to  implement 
independent  domestic  policies  as  a  result  of  increased  internationalisation’.  This 
definition will be helpful in assessing the validity of various arguments surrounding 
the concept of globalisation, including whether such a process exists. 
Later  an  alternative  interpretation  of  globalisation  viewed  from  a  historical 
perspective will be introduced. It will be argued that internationalisation in the form of 
increased  trade  and  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  is  the  nature  of  capitalist 
accumulation  process,  thus,  cannot  be  impeded  or  reversed  unless  extraordinary 
events  such  as  world  wars  or  severe  global  recessions  occur.  This  accumulation 
process necessarily creates its own ideological climate to facilitate acceptance of the 
doctrine and to justify the economic and social problems it creates. The over emphasis 
of  the  benefits  of  free  trade  arising  from  this  ideological  base,  and  the  recent 
unprecedented domination of the neoclassical theory (despite all of its theoretical and 
empirical failures) can be better understood from this perspective. This paper rejects 
the  ideas  that  draw  parallel  lines  between  globalisation  and  liberalisation.  It  will 
however  argue  that  there  is  a  globalisation  tendency  since  increased 
internationalisation inevitably weakens the role of nation states by transferring some 
of  their  functions  to  newly  created  supranational  states  that  are  created  by  the 
dynamics of this internationalisation process. Moreover the ever increasing power of 
multinational companies (MNCs) means that nation states increasingly need to take 
their influence into account. In other words, international actors increasingly influence 
the  policies  of  the  nation  state,  and  in  this  sense  contemporary  capitalism  is 
experiencing an important structural change.     
It should be made clear from the outset that defining globalisation accurately is 
not just a matter of academic curiosity; it also informs the direction of political action. 
An  accurate  definition  of  globalisation  will  determine its perception, therefore the   5 
nature of political action to endorse or confront it. The current confusion leads either 
to unqualified support or unqualified rejection of globalisation. The importance of 
defining globalisation accurately cannot be over-emphasised as it signifies the nature 
of contemporary capitalism.    
 
2. DEFINITIONS OF GLOBALISATION 
 
Globalisation  has  been defined in a number of alternative ways but there are two 
commonly used broad based approaches. The initial approach perceived globalisation 
as  the  spread  of  market  relations  in  terms  of  increased  trade  and  FDI.  A  broader 
definition of globalisation is ‘the integration of production, distribution, and use of 
goods and services among the economies of the world’ (Otsubo, 1996: 1). In this 
sense globalisation is synonymous with internationalisation. Why are there two terms 
existing to describe the same phenomenon? Two reasons emerge. First, ‘this sort of 
definition [...] proposes an ‘original condition’, a starting-point for the process’ where 
a  structural  change,  a  radical  increase  in  internationalisation  is  thought  to  occur 
(Radice,  1998:  3).
1    Second,  globalisation  is  perceived  as  a  ‘deepening’  of 
international economic relations as opposed to widening them in terms of the range of 
countries and other agents involved (Thompson, 1995: 199). 
  Furthermore,  globalisation  is  usually  associated  with  liberalisation  firstly 
because  pressures  of  capital  mobility,  technical  change  and  increased  market 
competition are assumed to have significantly reduced the role of the nation state; and 
secondly, liberalisation is seen as the most effective way to bring about globalisation. 
From this point of view ‘a truly global economy is one dominated by trans-national 
firms and financial institutions, operating in world markets independently of national 
boundaries, national political objectives and domestic economic constraints’ (Bairock 
& Wright, 1996: 3).  
  While  this  definition  is  broadly  accepted  by  the  ‘hyper-globalists’  (mostly 
neoclassical  economists),  and  ‘sceptics’  (mostly  structuralist  economists),  they 
disagree on the nature of globalisation and whether such a process is actually taking 
                                                            
1 This is what Weeks (1999) empirically tested and found no evidence. Thus ‘the new era’ thesis is 
rejected.   6 
place. The hyper-globalists believe that capital is free from all constraints and has 
enough power to penalize countries that attempt to limit this freedom. In this view, 
globalised markets are very difficult to regulate, and governments are therefore at the 
mercy of unruly global market forces. Countries that pursue interventionist policies 
will pay a heavy penalty. Internationally mobile capital will fly away from countries 
that restrict their freedom and in doing so will disadvantage their economies. These 
developments are not only very well advanced and unstoppable, but also desirable. By 
reducing  the  seemingly  arbitrary  interventions  of  governments,  globalisation  will 
allow market forces to increase efficiency and productivity through competition, and 
better resource reallocation. This integration is seen as of particular benefit to LDCs as 
the result of the movement of capital is to facilitate the more even distribution of 
capital  worldwide.  Globalisation  will  lead  to  the  elimination  of  all  national 
differences. We are witnessing the end of the Third World. 
This interpretation of globalisation has been criticized and challenged by the 
sceptics. None of these writers deny the importance of increased international trade 
and FDI. They, however, challenge the implications of this trend. They argue that 
there is no clear evidence of globalisation and therefore it is a myth since: 1. The 
existence of highly internationalised economies is not unprecedented (which implies 
that it should be unprecedented). 2. Genuine trans-national companies (TNCs) appear 
to be relatively rare (which implies that they should be more common) 3. Foreign 
direct investment is highly concentrated among the advanced industrial economies 
(which implies that it should be more evenly distributed and include LDCs). 4. Trade, 
investment and financial flows are concentrated in the Triad of Europe, Japan and 
North  America  (which  implies  regionalisation  but  not  globalisation).  5.  Major 
economic  powers  have  the  capacity  to  exert  powerful  governance  pressures  over 
financial markets and other economic trends (which implies that global markets are 
not beyond regulation and control) (Hirst & Thompson, 1996: 2).
2  
The  sceptics  rightly  point  out  that  we  are  living  in  a  very  disorderly  and 
fractured world where the rule is uneven development. The liberal idea of integration 
with harmony and prosperity is untenable. All major indicators show that the income 
                                                            
2 Weiss (1997: 7) also makes similar points and argues that ‘[i]f such a [globalisation] tendency existed, 
one would expect to find evidence indicating that the changes in question conformed to at least three 
criteria: novelty, magnitude and distribution.’    7 
gap between rich and poor countries has never been so wide. There is no evidence of 
convergence  and  regional  inequalities  persist.  The  nation  state  is  still  the  most 
important actor in international markets and will continue to be so for the foreseeable 
future.  
This  earlier  debate  lacked  depth  as  it  stemmed  from  the  simplistic 
presumptions of the hyper-globalists. The sceptics rightly reacted to the inaccuracies 
of the hyper-globalists’ interpretation but failed to engage in a deeper analysis of the 
structural changes in international capitalism. Therefore the debate remained fairly 
shallow. Hirst and Thompson (1996), for example, openly admit that they are dealing 
with the ‘most extreme’ or ‘strong’ version of the globalisation thesis and do not deny 
that there is a weak globalisation tendency which constraints certain types of national 
economic strategy. 
  In another article (Subasat, 2005) we have argued that although valuable as a 
counter-position  against  hyper-globalism,  the  sceptics’  arguments  are  essentially 
irrelevant to the globalisation debate and in some cases inaccurate. It is fairly easy to 
refute the hyper-globalists’ thesis as their arguments reflect their ideology rather than 
the  reality.  However,  the  obvious  naivety  of  such  interpretations  does  not  lend 
credence to their critiques. It is easy to compare the hypothetical expectations of their 
thesis with reality and argue that globalisation is a myth. Instead of an integration with 
harmony and prosperity for everyone, as hyper-globalists propose, another form of 
integration with greater inequality might be taking place, where the nation state might 
surrender some of its power to the new forms of supranational state structures created 
by the dynamics of this integration process.  
    An  important  problem  in  this  debate  derives  from  the  fact  that  many 
researchers  describe  the  characteristics  of  globalisation  rather  than  define  it.  For 
example the above definition is, in effect, not a definition but a description, and is 
consequently rather tautological.  If one defines globalisation as the spread of market 
relations in terms of increased trade and FDI coupled with liberalisation, this is a 
description of what has happened during the last 20-30 years, which is not refuted. 
Increasing international trade and international flows of capital are not per se evidence 
of  globalisation.  These  are  characteristics  of  internationalisation,  and  globalisation 
must  refer  to something different to have any analytical meaning. In other words, 
globalisation  should  refer  to  a  new  economic  structure  and  not  just  to  a  greater   8 
intensification  of  internationalisation  within  the  current  international  economic 
system. In the absence of an accurate definition and a clear separation of globalisation 
from internationalisation, the terms remain interchangeable even in the hands of the 
researchers who emphasise such differences in the first place. Moreover, due to its 
haziness,  such  a  definition  also  fails  to  comprehend  the  permanent  and  transitory 
characteristics  of  the  evolving  world  economy.  Although,  as  will  be  argued, 
internationalisation in the form of the expansion of trade and FDI can be seen as the 
essence of capitalism and of capital accumulation, the future of liberalisation policies 
will be determined politically. In other words, liberalisation is not the only available 
policy framework for a more global world.  
Based  on  the  failures  of  this  earlier  debate,  more  sophisticated  alternative 
approaches to defining globalisation have been developed, mainly by sociologists and 
international relations scholars. The ‘trans-formationalists’ have defined globalisation 
as  the  ‘intensification  of  worldwide  social  relations’  (Giddens,  1990:  64),  the 
‘widening, deepening and spreading of global interconnectedness’ and ‘accelerating 
interdependence’ (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt & Perraton, 2002).  
Although  more  accurate  compared  to  the  earlier  approach,  defining 
globalisation in such ways is also problematical for a number of reasons. First of all, 
such  definitions  are  rather  vague  and  the  authors  often  struggle  to  qualify  their 
definitions by producing pages of explanations that only complicate the picture even 
further, and render them useless for policymaking and political struggle.  
Secondly, interconnectedness and interdependence have been growing since 
the beginning of humankind and mapping the progress of globalisation since the time 
of  Adam  and  Eve  is  not  constructive  as  it  does  not  help  us  in  our  endeavour  to 
understand  the  current  structural  transformation  that  the  World  economy  is  going 
through.
3  Qualifying  such  definitions  by  ‘intensification’,  ‘widening’,  ‘deepening’, 
‘spreading’  or  ‘accelerating’  is  not  useful  as  this  is  not  the  first  time  that  social 
relations have intensified, widened, deepened or accelerated. The domestication of the 
horse, the invention of the wheel or the steam engine must have contributed more to 
the intensification of social relations than recent developments. Thirdly, like the first 
                                                            
3 The ‘novelty’ aspect of globalisation has been questioned by many ‘sceptics’. See Weiss (1998) and 
Hirst & Thompson (2003).   9 
definition,  such  definitions  give  a  sense  of  naturalness  and  inevitability  to  these 
changes and fail to understand the permanent and transitory features of them. Finally, 
such definitions fail to comprehend the structural transformation the world economy is 
going  through  as  they  reduce  changes  to  quantitative  accelerations  rather  than 
qualitative transformations. 
Scholte  (2002)  produces  a  slightly more sophisticated version of the trans-
formationalists arguments and defines globalisation as deterritorialisation, or as the 
spread  of  transplanetary  and,  in  recent  times  more  particularly,  supraterritorial 
connections between people. ‘From this perspective, globalisation involves reductions 
in barriers to transworld contacts. People become more able […] to engage with each 
other in ‘one world’’ (Scholte, 2002: 14). He argues that transplanetary relations refer 
to social links between people located at points anywhere on earth, within a whole-
world  context  and  supraterritorial  relations  are  social  connections  that  transcend 
territorial geography.  
  In the context of transplanetary relations, the world is seen as a single social 
space. Supraterritoriality, however, implies that territorial distance is covered in no 
time, and territorial boundaries present no particular impediment. ‘Distancelessness’ 
and the abolition of every possibility of ‘remoteness’ are the main characteristics of 
supraterritoriality. Scholte claims that although transplanetary connectivity has figured 
in  human  history  for  centuries,  supraterritoriality  is  relatively  new  and  the  rise  of 
supraterritoriality marks a striking break with the territorialist geography that came 
before.  Contemporary  transplanetary  links  are  also  much  denser  and  involve  the 
volume of transworld communications, diseases, finance, investment, travel and trade. 
Scholte gives a number of examples to qualify globality-as-supraterritoriality:  
 
[J]et airplanes transport passengers and cargo across any distance on the planet 
within  twenty-four  hours.  Telephone  and  computer  networks  effect 
instantaneous interpersonal communication between points all over the earth 
[…]. The global mass media spread messages simultaneously to transworld 
audiences.  The  US  dollar  and  the  euro  are  examples  of  money  that  has 
instantaneous transplanetary circulation, particularly when in digital form. In 
global  finance,  various  types  of  savings  and  investment  […]  flow 
instantaneously  in  world-scale  spaces.  In  the  field  of organizations, several   10 
thousand firms, voluntary associations and regulatory agencies coordinate their 
respective  activities across transworld domains. A global conference of the 
United Nations (UN) involves delegates from all over the planet at the same 
time.  Ecologically,  developments  such  as  climate  change  (so-called  ‘global 
warming’),  stratospheric  ozone  depletion,  certain  epidemics,  and  losses  of 
biological  diversity  unfold  simultaneously  on  a  world  scale  […]  (Scholte, 
2002: 18) 
 
Given the above examples, the distinction between transplanetary and supraterritorial 
is blurred and puzzling. If we focus on supraterritoriality which, in his view, signifies 
‘current’ globalisation, we can identify some weaknesses.     
  With  the  exception  of  computer  networks,  which  increase  not  only 
interpersonal  communication  but  also  facilitate  the  ‘international’  circulation  of 
finance,  the  above  examples  are  to  a  large  extent  misleading.  The  world  is  not  a 
contiguous  terrain  and  territorial  distance  is  far  from  ‘covered  in  no  time’,  and 
territorial boundaries do present impediment. If supraterritoriality as ‘distancelessness’ 
signifies globalisation, apart from telegraphs, telephones and computer networks, it 
does not and probably will not exist. Supraterritoriality in the form of telegraph and 
telephones have been around since the middle of nineteenth century and airplanes 
since the early twentieth century and, although international travel has expanded to 
unprecedented  levels,  this  does  not  prove supraterritoriality. A truly global money 
existed in the form of the gold standard which collapsed during World War One. 
Since the advent of nuclear technology the possibility of a global ecological disaster 
has existed and the possible impacts of global warming are far from uniform and free 
from  territorial  geographical  boundaries.  Widespread  epidemics  that  transcend 
national borders have existed for centuries.
4 Even within computer networks where 
‘distancelessness’  is  a  reality  and  supraterritoriality  is  evident,  the  importance  of 
geographical divisions remain as most people, particularly in the third world, do not 
have access to such technology.   
                                                            
4 One can only remind the outbreak of the plague in Europe between 1347 and 1353 that killed 25 
million people, approximately one-third of the population.   11 
Scholte  recognises  these  facts  but  claims  that  most  manifestations  of 
supraterritorial connectivity have reached unprecedented levels during the past half-
century. There is no doubt that technological changes have reduced the distance factor 
considerably  and  increased  social  links  between  people.  It  is  also  true  that 
contemporary ‘transplanetary links’ are denser than those of any previous epoch. Hirst 
and  Thompson  (2003:  17),  however,  claim  that  it  is  untrue  that  the  spread  of 
transplanetary and supraterritoriality has been faster than ever before.  
 
The 50 years between 1950-2000 are not remarkable when compared with the 
period  1850-1914  –  in  that  period  flows  of  merchandise  trade,  capital 
investment and labour migration were all comparable to or greater than those 
of today. Technological change in the form of international telegraph cables 
unified markets and led to price and interest rate convergence of a kind that 
has never been equalled since. Financial integration was far greater, and levels 
of capital export from the major lender countries unprecedented. (Hirst and 
Thompson, 2003: 17) 
 
Whoever is right about the speed of change, the fact remains that Scholte reduces 
globalisation to a decline in distance factor and in consequence to the technological 
changes  that  facilitate  it.  By  doing  so  he  simply  restates  the  obvious.  Such 
technological factors certainly play a part in ‘globalisation’ but globalisation cannot be 
reduced to distance reducing technological factors alone. Once Scholte’s approach is 
accepted, globalisation must be happening by definition, as it is difficult to refute the 
distance reducing technological changes. Such a definition of globalisation effectively 
removes  politics  from  the  debate  and,  in  this  view  anti-globalisation  has  no  real 
meaning.  As  such,  although  it  may  have  a  political  impact,  the  concept  is  fairly 
apolitical. The definition implies a sense of technological evolution that is politically 
neutral.    
  Finally,  with  the  exception  of  internet  technology,  there  is  very  little 
supraterritoriality  in  the  process  of  technological  change  and  even  if  the  speed  of 
technological change is faster, it is a continuation of on-going changes rather than a 
qualitative  breakthrough.  Scholte  (2002:  17)  states  that  ‘[u]nlike  earlier  times,   12 
contemporary  globalization
5  has  been  marked  by  a  large-scale  spread  of 
supraterritorialism’ which implies that in his view globalisation is not a new process 
but the continuation of an old process. 
 
3. HOW CAN GLOBALISATION BE ACCURATELY DEFINED?  
 
One obvious way is to define globalisation as a process that propels an international 
economy towards a truly global economy. It is then possible to deduce a definition of 
globalisation  by  identifying  the  most  fundamental  characteristics  of  a  truly  global 
economy. A truly global economy, as apposed to an international economy, would 
equate the world economy with that of a single country. Although one can stretch the 
limits  of  imagination,  the  following  would  be  some  of  the  most  important 
characteristics:  
There would be no national borders and people and capital would be free to 
move wherever they want and settle down, work and invest. There would be a single 
global state and global laws that all people would obey. The nation states would either 
disappear or diminish to the level of local authorities. Nationalism as the ideology of 
the nation state would disappear. Although differences would exist, there would be a 
cultural convergence, including perhaps a common global language. Politics would be 
organised globally. There would be global elections and political parties. Some non-
governmental organisations would also organise globally.  
  The  existence  of  supranational  states,  and  the  disappearance  or  a  radical 
transformation of the nation state, describe and distinguish a global world from a non-
global (international) world. From this narrative it is possible to deduce a definition of 
globalisation  as  ‘a  relative  decline  in  the  nation  state’s  role/power  to  implement 
independent domestic policies as a result of increased internationalisation’. According 
to this definition, globalisation is a political process driven by economic incidents. A 
relative  weakening  and  transformation  of  the  nation  state,  combined  with  the 
emergence of transnational states defines globalisation.  
It is important to emphasize the word ‘relative’ since the weakening of the 
nation  state  is  not  a  uniform  process  and  there  will  always  be  some  states  more 
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powerful than the others in terms of their ability to implement independent policies, 
and the part they play in the globalisation process. As will be explained later on, 
countries experience globalisation according to their own specific circumstances. A 
reduction  in  the  role  of the nation state may or may not mean a reduction in the 
‘power’ of the nation state. The nation state may be coerced into reducing its role or 
voluntarily surrender some of its power to other international institutions or perhaps 
initiate this process. In this sense the nation state is an integral part of this process. 
There are significant differences between developed and developing countries facing 
globalisation as well as within these broad categories. Developed countries tend to 
lead the globalisation process while developing countries respond more passively to 
the changing environment. It is also important to note that a relative decline of the 
‘nation state’ does not mean, as liberals often believe, the decline and disappearance 
of  the  ‘state’,  or  ‘statelessness’  which  is  inconceivable.  Although  the  ‘state’  has 
existed for thousands of years in many different forms, the ‘nation state’ as a specific 
state form is relatively new and linked to the emergence of industrial society and 
capitalism.  As  the  importance  of  the  nation  state  declines,  transnational  states 
undertake some of their functions.  
Moreover,  the  ‘independence’  of  the  nation  state  to  implement  domestic 
policies  refers  to  its  independence  from  outside  influences,  such  as  international 
capital and supranational states. Nation states are not ‘independent’ institutions and 
their  policies  are  determined  by  complex  social  interactions.  Even  though  Murray 
(1971) accepted that internationalisation tends to reduce the power of nation states in 
general, Poulantzas (1975) argued that nation states had no power of their own, but 
instead expressed and crystallized class powers. Both arguments are consistent with 
our  definition.  Nation  states  increasingly  need  to  respond  to  the  demands  of 
international  capital  as  well  as  newly  created  supranational  states.  The  relative 
autonomy of the nation state from classes is a very controversial issue that will not be 
analysed  here.  See  Fine  &  Harris  (1979:  158)  for  the  details  of  this  particular 
discussion.  
  In  this  definition  the  core  difference  between  globalisation  and 
internationalisation lies in the role of the nation state. ‘A truly global economy is one 
[...]  in  which  distinct  national  economies  and,  therefore,  domestic  strategies  of 
national economic management are increasingly irrelevant’ (Hirst & Thompson, 1996:   14 
1). In its extreme form, a truly global world is one where the nation state has no 
decisive role or power.
6 Globalisation, then, must be defined as a process (not an 
event) where the nation state’s role/power relatively declines in the implementation of 
national  policies.  In  this  sense,  globalisation  does  not  require  a  complete 
disintegration of the nation state. Rather it requires a reconstruction of the nation state 
as an empowering instrument of international capital.  
This definition will clarify a number of confusions in the characteristics of 
globalisation. First of all, to argue that the nation state loses power as a result of 
globalisation is contradictory since globalisation is now defined as the loss of the 
nation state’s power. 
  Secondly,  an  increase  in  international  trade  or  FDI  does  not  automatically 
imply globalisation (it implies internationalisation) unless it also reduces the nation 
state’s power. It can be argued that internationalisation may contribute to globalisation 
since, for example, an autarkic economy is by definition easier to manage within the 
boundaries of a nation state. From this perspective, however, the correlation between 
globalisation  and  internationalisation  is  weaker.  As  Weiss  (1997:  20)  persuasively 
argues,  strong  states  may  well  be  facilitators  of  internationalisation  rather  than 
‘victims’ of it. Trade and FDI are usually promoted by strong states as in the case of 
the so-called East Asian Miracle countries.  
  Thirdly, globalisation does not necessarily imply liberalisation. Liberalisation, 
by definition, refers to a reduction in the nation state’s intervention and in this sense 
(hypothetically speaking) a truly liberalised world would also be a truly globalised 
world. A non-liberal (or interventionist) form of globalisation, however, is possible as 
long as the role of the nation state is replaced by the supranational states, which may 
implement interventionist policies. The binding rules of various forms of international 
institutions  and  regional  integration  activities  do  reduce  the  sovereignty  and 
role/power of the nation states to implement independent national policies. As will be 
                                                            
6 When the nation state does not have any power, it may cease to exist or reduced to the level of local 
authorities. In this case, a truly globalised world is where there are no nation states and no national 
borders. A truly global economy cannot be created as long as the nations state exists. As long as the 
nation state exists it will have some power/function. Globalisation is in this sense ‘does not mean that 
national boundaries are disappearing. Far from it. There are more nation-states in the world today than 
any other time previously’ (Drache, 1996: 31).    15 
elaborated on in section three, the creation of strong (stronger) supranational states to 
absorb  and  reduce  the  power  of  the  nation  states  should  be  seen  as  a  sign  of 
globalisation. Such state structures, however, can implement interventionist policies.    
Fourthly,  the  decline  of  the  nation  state  can  take  seemingly  contradictory 
forms:  centralisation  and  decentralisation,  integration  and  disintegration, 
internationalisation and localisation. These are in fact complementary processes. In 
other words, the creation of the supranational states does not reduce the importance of 
the local. Even in a truly globalised word, local differences will exist. In the USA,  for 
example, the federal states have substantial powers over economic and social policies 
such as taxation, employment, economic development, transport, education, policing, 
justice  and  health.  The  nation  state  may  give  way  to  both  supranational  and 
subnational institutions, which involves the distribution of power from central to local 
levels. Most countries are both integrated into the world economy and devolve power 
to local governments and communities.  
Fifthly, although imperialism can be defined in a number of alternative ways, 
whichever  definition  is  adopted,  there  is  little  doubt  that  globalisation  is  an 
imperialistic  process.  This  article  will  not  explore  the  imperialistic  nature  of 
globalisation as many radical writers have already done this. However it is important 
to separate these two concepts, as globalisation is not a euphemism for imperialism. 
Imperialism  has  a  long  history  whereas  globalisation  is  relatively  new.  Although 
imperialistic trends may take new forms in the globalisation process, it is a mistake to 
equate them.  
  Finally, unlike the mainstream definitions, this definition does not presume 
globalisation and allows room for caution. Although the creation and increasing power 
of  the  supranational  states  indicates  a  tendency  to  globalisation  by  reducing  the 
role/power  of  the  nation  states,  this  may  not  be  a  permanent  feature  of  the 
contemporary capitalist world economy and may be reversible. Indeed, many writers, 
while  recognising  the  structural  changes  in  the  world  economy,  have  argued  that 
nation states are capable of finding ways to adjust to and deal with the challenges that 
the  new  conditions  bring  about.  Therefore,  they  argue  there  is  evidence  of 
adaptability, but no real weakening in the capacity of nation states to manage their 
own affairs.   16 
Moreover, even if globalisation is taking place, it may be a reversible process. 
As will be argued in the next section, one important objective behind the formation of 
the  supranational  states  (that  in  our  view  identifies  globalisation)  is  to  moderate 
international  rivalries  that  are  provoked  by  increased  internationalisation  and 
competition  between  international  bourgeoisies  (as  well  as  establishing  stronger 
domination over the working classes). The inner-rivalries of the international capital   
that the supranational states are supposed to moderate may however easily spiral out 
of control and damage the system itself. The unilateralist US policies followed by 
George W Bush, for example, are reflections of increased international conflict that 
may damage globalisation as a process. As Engler argues,    
 
Particularly since September 11, 2001, Bush’s globalization policy has been 
quite different from what characterized the Clinton years. As in its military 
actions,  the  current  administration  has  shown  a  penchant  for  go-it-alone 
nationalism  in  its  economic  negotiations.  This  has  led  to  a  type  of  bare-
knuckles promotion of U.S. interests distinct from the multilateralist model of 
global capitalism advanced in the 1990s. As a result of this shift, as well as a 
concurrent global economic downturn, trade talks in recent years have been 
combative, tense, and often unproductive (Engler, 2004). 
 
Unilateralist US policies may legitimise and encourage similar policies worldwide and 
damage  EU-US  relations.  The  recent  US  steel  tariff  dispute  and  the  deadlock  in 
Cancun  due  to  a  lack  of  willingness  by  the  US  to  open  up  its  markets  are  two 
important examples. Such policies are clearly in conflict with globalisation and reflect 
its reversibility. However, once we accept that globalisation is an uneven and unlinear 
process, it becomes evident that more time is needed to reach such a conclusion. 
 
4. A POLITICAL ECONOMY INTERPRETATION OF GLOBALISATION 
 
In  response  to  the  weakness  of  the  hyper-globalists’  and  sceptics’  arguments,  an 
alternative literature has burgeoned based on the idea that ‘the nation-state is neither 
retaining its primacy nor disappearing, but becoming transformed and absorbed’ into a 
larger  transnational  state  system  (Robinson,  1998;  Radice,  1998).  In  other  words,   17 
globalisation denotes a transition process from the nation state phase of capitalism to a 
qualitatively new transnational state phase where the nation state is transferring some 
of its power to those newly formed transnational states.  
Internationalisation  in  the  form  of  trade  and  FDI  is  the  nature  of  capital 
accumulation. The rapid quantitative increase in internationalisation, particularly in 
the form of FDI, at this particular juncture in capitalist history requires a qualitative 
structural change and necessarily creates transnational states to regulate this process. 
These  transnational  states  remove  part  of  the  nation  state’s  functions  and  create 
globalisation trends. The increase in the number and role of these new state structures 
are directly linked to increased internationalisation in a dialectical process. In other 
words, although the speed of these changes may or may not be greater compared to 
previous epochs in the history of capitalism, the spread of internationalisation has 
reached a point that requires qualitative structural changes to manage this process. In 
this sense globalisation can also be defined as ‘a process of transition from the nation 
state phase of capitalism to a qualitatively new supranational state phase where the 
nation states are transformed and absorbed into a larger supranational state system’. 
Capital  accumulation  necessitates  the  expansion  of  capital  beyond  national 
borders  and  produces  the  process  of  internationalisation.  Marx  argued  that  the 
centralization of capital is the nature of capital accumulation.
7 When possibilities for 
expansion  in  the  domestic  markets  are  exhausted,  capital  quickly  expands  beyond 
national boundaries to seek new market opportunities. As Marx and Engels wrote in 
the Communist Manifesto, capitalism is a very expansionary and aggressive system.  
In one of their most widely quoted lines, they said ‘the need of a constantly expanding 
market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It 
must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere’ (Marx 
and Engels, 1977: 83). Internationalisation in this sense is rooted deep in the nature of 
the capital accumulation process. Through internationalisation, domestic economies of 
                                                            
7 Centralization means monopolization of huge mass of means of production in the hands of smaller 
number of capitalists. Marx explains the logic of concentration in Capital as follows: ‘The battle of 
competition is fought by cheapening of commodities. The cheapness of commodities demands, caeteris 
paribus, on the productiveness of labour, and this again on the scale of production. Therefore, the larger 
capitals beat the smaller.’ (Marx, 1990: 777)    18 
nation states integrate into the world economy. The more a country integrates into the 
world economy, the more it influences and is influenced by it. 
The  internationalisation  of  capital  takes  three  different  forms:  that  of 
commodity,  money  and  production.  Commodity  capital  was  the  main  form  of 
internationalisation in the 19th century. Financial capital also internationalised by the 
end of the 19th century with the development of the credit system. Although it existed 
to a limited extent earlier, the real expansion of productive capital came after the 
Second World War with the birth of the MNCs, and significantly intensified during 
the 1980s and 1990s.  
  The  sequence  of  internationalisation  of  these  three  forms  of  capital  is 
determined predominantly by developments in the forces of production and a number 
of political changes. International mobility of capital is a technical issue as well as 
political  one.  Recent  developments  for  example,  should  be  seen  in  the  light  of  a 
number of technological and political changes. New production techniques and rapid 
developments in the electronic and telecommunication sectors, as well as a dramatic 
fall in transport costs, played an important role in this process. They enhanced the 
ability of productive capital to move and organize itself internationally without the 
need to consider the distance between different production units. In addition the end of 
the  Cold  War,  the  failure  of  the  Keynesian  policies  to  manage  the  international 
economic crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, and a general fall in the political power of 
workers and their organizations have facilitated this process.  
The sceptics often argue that the contemporary internationalisation process is 
not unprecedented and trade and capital flows before 1913 were not dissimilar in size 
to  flows  in  the  post-war  period  (Weiss,  1997).  They  claim  that  for  a  number  of 
industrialised nations trade intensity is only marginally greater in 1991 than in 1913. 
Hirst  and  Thompson  (1996:  2)  claims  that  ‘[i]n  some  respects,  the  current 
international economy is less open and integrated than the regime that prevailed from 
1870  to  1914’.  This  is  an  important  argument,  which,  if  true,  could  negate  our 
arguments. In other words, if the nature of the current internationalisation process is 
not fundamentally different from the old one, one would not expect any significant 
structural changes in the management of this new process. The nation state would 
remain as the prime actor, there would be no need for transnational state structures   19 
and  therefore  no  case  for  globalisation  as  we  have  defined  it.  These  arguments, 
however, are mistaken and can be criticized from a number of perspectives.  
Firstly, the level and speed of trade integration mainly depends on whether the 
figures are calculated using constant or current prices. The above arguments are based 
on a calculation of trade intensity using current price export and GDP. van Bergeijk & 
Mensink (1997), in contrast, argue that any historical comparison should be based on 
constant prices since service dominated GDP price index tends to increase much faster 
than the manufacture dominated exports price index. This means that ‘a historical 
comparison of a nation’s trade ratio that is based on nominal values suffers from the 
fact  that  the  price  increase  for  services  persistently  exceeds  the  price  increase  for 
manufactures’ (van Bergeijk & Mensink, 1997: 164). They show that when calculated 
with constant prices, the world trade ratio in 1996 (13.5%) is much higher than the 
1820s (5%). Kitson and Michie (1995) also calculated the trade ratio using constant 
prices and found not only that trade openness today is much higher than during the 
pre-war period, but that it increased dramatically after the 1950s. Maddison (2000: 
363)  produced  more  significant  results.  The  world  trade  ratio  increased  from  4.6 
percent in 1870 to 17.2 percent in 1998.  The same figures are 4.9 percent to 28.7 
percent  for  France,  9.5  percent  to  38.9  percent  for  Germany,  0.2  percent  to  13.4 
percent for Japan, 12.2 percent to 25.0 percent for the UK, 2.5 percent to 10.1 percent 
for the USA. Whichever measure is used, trade integration is continuing and there is 
no sign of a slow down.      
Secondly, trade integration can only expand until all tradable commodities are 
traded. This implies a structural limit to internationalisation through trade integration. 
Therefore the increase in trade intensity is expected to slow down and even stop once 
the peak has been reached. Moreover, it is often argued that a gradual decline in the 
share of manufacturing (and agriculture) in total GDP may mean less trade integration 
as the share of ‘less trade-intensive’ services rises.
8 International trade, however, is 
                                                            
8 Figures suggest that the share of services in total trade is substantial and has been increasing. World 
Bank  data  suggests  that  world  service  exports  to  merchandise  export  ratio  was  18%  in  1980  and 
increased to 22% in 1995. Not only financial capital but also many business services have become 
internationally  tradable  as  transaction  and  communication  costs  fall  (Nunnenkamp  &  Gundlach, 
1995:2). Services can also be exported indirectly without being registered to the official export figures 
when people are mobile. This means that services are no longer isolated from the international markets.   20 
only one of many different forms of internationalisation and there is a complex and 
dynamic relationship between them.
9  
Capital  market  integration  is  another  major  form  of  internationalisation. 
During the last few decades, the international flows of financial capital has increased 
so dramatically that globalization is often characterised by this massive transfer of 
money. Every day trillions of dollars are traded on foreign exchange markets which 
amount to many times more than the total value of world trade and GDP. Whether the 
phenomenal internationalization of capital markets signifies a permanent or transitory 
feature of internationalisation process is not clear,
10 its impacts on national economies 
are obvious. As Stiglitz (2000) argues ‘[o]ver the last 20 years, financial crises have 
become more frequent and more costly’. As the recent crises in Mexico (1994), Asia 
(1997),  Argentina  (2001)  and  Turkey  (2000  and  2001)  indicate,  the 
internationalization of financial capital makes national economies more vulnerable to 
short term capital and money movements. 
  A further form of internationalisation is the ‘non-equity forms of cooperation’ 
which  is  less  visible  but  still  very  considerable.
11  Moreover,  non-tradable 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Tourism is one of the very well known cases of indirect export of services. Services such as health and 
education  can  also  be  exported  indirectly.  The  biggest  barrier  restraining  people’s  mobility  is  the 
transport cost that has been declining substantially. People are indeed more mobile domestically as well 
as internationally.  
9 For example an increase in FDI may have a negative or positive impact on exports depending on 
whether FDI and exports are substitutes or complementaries.Trade policy itself may have impacts on 
FDI in different ways. For example the threat of protection had a substantial impact on Japanese FDI in 
the  US  in  1980s.  For  more  detail  see  Nunnenkamp  &  Gundlach  (1995)  and  WTO  (1996).  The 
International  Chamber  of  Commerce  (ICC)  however  suggests  that  ‘[t]he  conventional  distinction 
between trade and investment no longer reflects business realities; presence in a local market is now 
frequently vital to be able to compete. Companies trade to invest and they invest to trade’ (ICC, 1997). 
10 The growth of international financial flows was largely triggered by the deregulation of financial 
markets and the abandonment of capital controls which are reversible policies. See Pettifor (2003) for 
further details. 
11 ‘NEC covers a broad and heterogeneous range of cross-border activities of companies. They include 
in  particular:  R&D  cooperation;  joint  ventures  with  minor  foreign  equity  stakes;  the  supply  of 
technology or trademarks through licensing agreements; production sharing arrangements, international 
subcontracting that involves firms with a local majority stake; as well as contracts on franchising and 
turnkey projects’. (Nunnenkamp & Gundlach, 1995: 4)   21 
commodities are integrated into the internationalisation process through FDI which 
involves  not  only  the  tradable  commodities  but  also  non-tradable.  Although  there 
might be structural constraints on trade, there are no such limits on FDI, which can 
expand absolutely and relatively without any boundaries.    
  The predominant form of the current internationalisation process, however, is 
FDI. A very strong upward trend in FDI is observed in almost all relative and absolute 
indicators of international production, and this now exceeds trade as the other major 
form  of  internationalisation.  The  internationalisation  of  productive  capital  and  the 
formation of extremely large MNCs are relatively new phenomena which have been 
so  profound  that  some  have  suggested  that  globalisation,  as  opposed  to 
internationalisation, should be identified by the rise of MNCs and FDI.
12 MNCs are 
immensely powerful institutions and their production capacity now has reached record 
levels.  The  following  facts,  produced  by  the  World  Investment  Report  (2000  and 
2003), will be helpful in assessing the importance of MNCs and FDI in this new 
internationalisation process.        
  FDI inflows have increased steadily throughout the post-war period and more 
rapidly during the 1980s. Since 1980 FDI has grown many times faster than world 
trade and output. The annual global inflows increased dramatically from $55 billion in 
1980 to $1393 billion in 2000, and declined to $824 billion in 2001 and $651 billion 
in 2002 due to slow economic growth in most parts of the world (WIR, 2003). The 
ratio of world FDI inflows to global gross fixed capital formation increased from 2.3 
percent in 1980 to 20.8 percent in 2000, and declined to 12.8 percent in 2001 and 12.2 
percent in 2002. The inward stock of FDI continuously rose from $699 billion in 1980 
to $7123 billion in 2002. Its share in world GDP increased from 6.7 percent to 22.3 
percent. In developing countries the same figure was nearly 33 percent in 2001. There 
are now some 64,000 transnational parent firms (about 7,000 at the end of the 1960s) 
                                                            
12 For example Costello et al (1989: 39) argues that ‘globalisation trend which is clearly new, post-war 
phenomenon  is  the  growth  of  transnational  corporations  which  organize  a  growing  division  of 
production between plants in different countries.’ Kozul-Wright (1995: 135) also argues that ‘[t]his rise 
of the TNC, on many accounts, mark a transition from the Golden Age to a ‘globalising age’. In these 
accounts, the role of TNCs as long-standing organizers of a broad range of cross-border economic 
assets and activities has been transformed by new technologies and the relaxation of regulatory controls;   22 
with around 870,000 foreign affiliates. FDI is more important than trade in delivering 
goods  and  services  internationally.  In  2002,    global  sales  by  TNCs  reached  $18 
trillion,  which  is  significantly  higher  than  world  exports  of  $8  trillion.  The  sales 
figures  for  foreign  affiliates  worldwide  increased  from  $3  trillion  in  1980  to  $14 
trillion  in  1999.  This  figure  would  be  significantly  higher  if  subcontracting, 
franchising  and  licensing  were  to  be  included.  The  gross  product  associated  with 
international production increased from about 5 percent of global GDP in 1982 to 10 
percent  in  1999.  On  the  technology  side  an  estimated  70  per  cent  of  the  global 
payments of royalties and fees constitute transactions between parent firms and their 
affiliates. Two-thirds of world trade is controlled by MNCs through intra-firm trade 
among MNCs and MNC exports to non-affiliates. 
  The above figures are impressive but they may not reflect the real significance 
of internationalisation in the form of FDI since they record only the initial entry of a 
firm into a foreign location and subsequent expansions by affiliates often involve little 
or no FDI. MNCs advance capital from different sources such as commercial banks, 
local and international equity markets, public organizations and their own corporate 
systems  in  the  form  of  internally  generated  profits  for  reinvestment.  When  these 
different sources are considered, investment into foreign affiliates are estimated to be 
four times bigger than FDI flows (WIR, 1997: 5). Even this figure does not capture 
additional investment controlled by TNCs via various non-equity measures, including 
corporate alliances.  
Therefore, even if trade flows before 1913 were not dissimilar in size to flows 
in the post-war period, there are events that are substantially different that are relevant 
to  and  important  for  the  globalisation  debate.  These  are  the  creation  of  massive 
MNCs,  which  control  not  only  FDI  but  also  two  third  of  world  trade,  and  the 
formation of supranational organizations.
13 By controlling international trade, MNCs 
may  be  able  to  impose  substantial  constraints  on  nation  states.  The  creation  of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
free from their national setting and with a fully internalised governance structure these firms can now 
pursue global strategies of production, marketing, and profit seeking.’ 
13 ‘The intra-firm trade among MNCs accounts for about one third of world trade, and that MNC 
exports  to  non-affiliates  account  for  another  third  of  world  trade,  with  the  remaining  one  third 
accounting for by trade among national (non-MNC) firms.’ (WTO, Annual Report, 1996: 44)   23 
supranational organizations such as the UN, IMF, WB, WTO, EU, and NAFTA is also 
relatively new and very relevant to the debates on globalisation.
14  
There  are  several  technological  factors  driving  this  process.  1.  The 
centralization process is intensified by the growing economies of scale and scope, 
particularly the initial fixed cost of research and development. 2. ‘[T]he flexibility that 
comes from reprogrammable capital equipment means that these large units can serve 
smaller, specialized niche markets’ (Costello et al, 1989: 39). 3. Standardization of 
production  and  production  techniques  has  made  it  possible  to  expand  production 
beyond  national  borders.  4.  The  introduction  of  new  technologies  which  make 
productive capital more light and mobile, and developments in telecommunication 
technology which reduced the importance of the ‘distance’ factor. 5. A substantial fall 
in  transport  costs.  6.  International  advertising  and  marketing  strategies  that  helps 
consumption patterns to converge. Because of these technological developments it is 
now easier to locate production in different parts of the world. The requirement of 
supervision and enforcement of standards previously required the production process 
to  be  carried  out  within  a  single  production  unit.  Today  the  manufacture  of 
components  in  the  production  process  can  be  dispersed  across  the  globe  or  sub-
contracted to other firms, prior to assembly.  
The large MNCs are the driving force and the biggest beneficiaries of this new 
economic order. As MNCs grow in size, they increase their relative economic and 
political power, and their strategic influence which helps them to gain concessions and 
better deals in the bargaining process with workers and nation states. There are two 
ways through which MNCs can exert influence on state policies.  
Firstly, as a result of increased flexibility MNCs ‘[c]an relocate production 
internationally, wielding immense power over trade unions and national governments’ 
(Costello et al, 1989: 39). In this case MNCs can passively respond to the policies of 
the nation state simply by not investing. Such a threat may be significant enough to 
persuade  governments  to  pursue  more  pro-FDI  policies  and  give  significant 
concessions. However, as many researches have shown, the determinants of FDI are 
complex and multidimensional which allows the nation state a great deal of flexibility 
                                                            
14  UN  and  its  sub-agencies  such  as  UNDP,  UN  Commission  for  Human  Rights,  UN  Environment 
Programme, UNESCO, Save the Children, FAO, ILO, WHO; and other NGO’s such as Green Peace, 
Friends of the Earth, Amnesty International, Oxfam, Christian Aid, Red Cross, etc.     24 
to negotiate the conditions of FDI with MNCs. Although MNCs may benefit from 
lower levels of labour costs, taxation, regulation, unionisation and a flexible work 
environment, they also require access to large domestic markets (both total and per 
capita  GDP),  political  stability,  good  infrastructure,  a  skilled  work  force  and 
membership  of  an  economic  and  political  grouping  within  which  to  function. 
Therefore there is a trade off between the functional requirements of the MNCs and 
the operating environment that the nation state can offer. 
A  number  of  countries,  such  as  China,  have  been  able  to  exert  robust 
conditions on FDI.
15 Moreover, FDI is not a pre-condition for economic development 
and  countries  may  prefer  not  having  FDI  rather  than having to comply with their 
demands.  Many  countries,  such  as  Japan  and  South  Korea,  have  successfully 
developed despite having very rigid policies that limit FDI inflows. The positive and 
negative impacts of FDI are also far from being uncontroversial. Therefore, although a 
significant tool in the armoury of the MNCs, withdrawing investment or declining to 
invest is not the most effective way in which MNCs can exercise influence over nation 
states.  If it were, the sceptics would have been more accurate in their arguments.  
MNCs, however, are much more aggressive in their pursuit to control world markets. 
They  do  not  passively  respond  to government policies, they aim at shaping them. 
Therefore,  the  second  way  through  which  MNCs  can  exert  influence  on  the  state 
policies  is  more  important  and  relevant  to  our  debate.  Although  there  is  a  clear 
tendency to exaggerate the power of MNCs and the powerlessness of nation states in 
the  relevant  literature,  it  is  obvious  that  big  businesses  have  increasingly  stronger 
influence on governments through lobbying activities domestically, as well as through 
international organizations.  
 
At international level, MNE representatives are active in lobbying the World 
Trade  Organization,  the  European  Commission,  the  International  Standards 
Organization,  the  UN  Commission  on  Sustainable  Development  and  many 
other bodies concerned with regulatory matters and corporate behaviour. [...] 
The  US  has  been  particularly  effective  at  this,  using  the  threat  of  trade 
                                                            
15 Needless to say the ability of the nation states to negotiate with MNCs are country specific and not all 
countries can be as successful as China.   25 
sanctions to pry open new markets for American business in films and TV, 
motor  vehicles,  tobacco,  agricultural  products,  pharmaceuticals,  etc. 
(Understanding the Global Issues, 1997: 1) 
 
MNCs  actively  lobby  international  organisations  such  as  the  WTO  for  investment 
agreements  focused  on  investors’  rights  through  their  representatives  such  as  the 
International  Chamber  of  Commerce  (ICC),  the  Business  and  Industry  Advisory 
Committee  to  the  OECD  (BIAC),  the  European  Round  Table  of  Industrials,  the 
European  American  Business  Council,  the  United  States  Council  for  International 
Business, the Fédération Bancaire de l'Union Européenne, European Union’s Foreign 
Trade  Association,  the  European  Services  Forum,  the  Union  of  Industrial  and 
Employers’  Confederations  of  Europe  (UNICE),  the  International  Organisation  of 
Employers, and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development  
  As  MNCs  control  two-thirds  of  international  trade,  they  are  the  major 
beneficiaries of WTO rules. Encouraged by MNCs, the WTO, however, is not limited 
to international trade and increasingly covers international investment rules.  
 
The  ICC  foresees  a  growing  agenda  for  the  WTO  since  it  is  no  longer 
sufficient to focus on barriers to "trade", in its traditional sense, as the primary 
impediments to doing business across frontiers. The emphasis today must be 
on a wider conception of market access - on the international rules for doing 
business on a global scale. […] The ICC urged the first Ministerial Conference 
of the WTO to aim to build a solid consensus for work to begin within the 
WTO to establish a truly global framework of rules and disciplines to govern 
cross-border direct investment. (ICC, 1997) 
 
The WTO agreements which were established during the Uruguay Round of (GATT) 
trade negotiations (1986-1993) such as Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and 
The General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) are powerful instruments to 
promote  MNCs’  interests  and  limit  the  ability  of  nation  states  to  manage  their 
economies.    26 
  In  1997,  OECD  governments  negotiated  a  Multilateral  Agreement  on 
Investment (MAI), which aimed at removing the remaining restrictions on foreign 
investment. The MAI was an attempt to establish the absolute domination of  MNCs 
over  states,  which  was  defeated  in  1998  as  a  result  of  worldwide  mass  protests. 
Renato  Ruggiero,  the  Director-General  of  the  WTO,  in  an  October  1996  speech 
presented to the United Nations Committee on Trade and Development said ‘[w]e are 
no longer writing the rules of interaction among separate national economies. We are 
writing the constitution of a single global economy’ (UNCTAD, 1996). 
  The MAI included not only FDI but also intellectual property and portfolio 
investment.  The  agreement  would  have  given  MNCs’  extraordinary  rights  over 
governments including protection against social unrest and the ability to take states to 
an international court. Clearly, MAI represented an attempt to create a world governed 
by,  and  for,  MNCs.  MNCs  and  their  representatives  were  obviously  behind  the 
proposal.  The ICC for example stated that, 
 
The ICC calls upon the G7 governments to take the lead to ensure that the 
MAI negotiations are concluded as soon as possible and to reject pressures to 
link the Agreement with environmental and labour standards. […] Most of the 
problems  addressed  under  the  agreement  occur  outside  the  OECD 
membership. It is thus crucial that as many non-OECD countries as possible 
accede to the agreement. (ICC, 1997) 
 
Although the MAI was defeated in 1998, it would be too naïve to assume that what 
MAI intended to achieve is off the agenda. Many writers believe that developments 
included in existing agreements, particularly TRIMS, are attempts to resurrect MAI. 
There is little doubt that MNCs will keep on working until they achieve the complete 
liberalisation of world markets which will allow them to expand their business. The 
WTO rules go far beyond mere liberalisation. They aim to restructure the whole world 
economy in line with the demands of MNCs.     
The  ‘tendency  of  concentration  and  centralisation  of  capital’  argument 
employed by Marx implies that one can only expect a few large MNCs to increase 
their domination over world markets. As the size and power of MNCs increase, their 
ability  to  influence  policies  at  national  and  international  levels  also  increase.   27 
Economic power always brings some degree of political power. Through lobbying or 
other  practices,  governments  have  to  take  big  business  into  account  when  they 
produce  their  economic  policies.  It  is  not  a  secret  that  in  many  countries,  large 
companies make substantial donations to political parties and often use illegitimate 
strategies such as bribery, and support for oppressive regimes.  
The  above  arguments  may  explain  the  nature  of  globalisation  as  a 
contemporary  phenomenon.  The  difference  between  the  old  internationalisation 
process,  which  was  mainly  based  on  international  trade,  and  the  new  current 
internationalisation,  which  is  based  on  FDI,  is  substantial.  Although 
internationalisation  through  trade  integration  can be managed by the nation states, 
internationalisation  through  FDI  requires  supranational  states.  Earlier 
internationalisation  required  larger  markets,  which  could  be  achieved  through 
colonisation. Production was done locally and goods were traded internationally. The 
new process of internationalisation, however, requires world markets to be integrated 
into  larger  entities.  This  is  achieved  by  creating  supranational  states,  particularly 
through regional integration activities. 
The concept of the state is at the heart of the globalisation debate. The role of 
the state can be approached from two broad perspectives. One is concerned with the 
effectiveness and the power of the nation state in the management of economy. The 
discussions between neoclassicals and structuralists have traditionally been based on 
this criterion. Many hyper-globalists insist that the power of global capital undermines 
monetary and fiscal policies and forces all governments to adopt similar neoliberal 
policies. With national economies more open than ever, governments seem to have 
lost  control  over  their  economies  and  have  less  ability  to  pursue  independent 
economic policies. The sceptics contested these ideas by arguing that  
 
‘[t]he problem with ‘powerlessness’ argument is not that it is wrong about the 
new  constraints  on  government  capacity  to  make  and  implement  policy. 
Rather,  it  is  the  assumption  that  such  constraints  are  absolute  rather  than 
relative [...] rather than an evolving history of state adaptation to both external 
and internal challenges’ (Weiss, 1997: 13). 
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The trouble with this debate is that it isolates the nation state from its social and 
historical context, and relies on purely technical arguments. In this sense the logic of 
both  positions  are  very  similar.  Both  views  are  based  on  the  state  versus  market 
dichotomy and both views see the relationship between the market and the state as a 
power struggle to dominate each other. Thus, a weakening role for the nation state 
represents a defeat on the part of state in its struggle against market forces. The core of 
this debate is, then, whether the nation state is actually losing this struggle.  
  The  alternative  political  economy  approach  claims  that  the  ‘state  versus 
market’ debate is irrelevant to globalisation and economists on both sides display an 
inaccurate understanding of the concept of state. In this view the functions of the 
capitalist state are determined by the need to accumulate capital and to control the 
pursuant class struggle that represents the conflict between capital and labour, and to 
regulate  the  competing  interests  of  capital.  ‘The  primary  function  of  the  state-in-
general is to guarantee the reproduction of capitalist social relations - relations which 
pertain to the existence of capital-in-general’ (Fine and Harris, 1979: 146). This view 
of the state provides a powerful device to the understanding of the structural changes 
the world economy is going through, and the new forms of state structures that are 
associated with it.  
It is clear that at certain junctures in history one can identify different types of 
state and different degrees of state intervention, which are determined by a complex 
set of influences. For example, while the period after the WW2 can be characterized 
by the increasing internationalisation of productive capital; strengthening of the labour 
movements and the increased role of the nation state in economic management, the 
1980s and 1990s are characterized by an erosion in the role of the national state; dis-
empowerment  of  the  labour  movements  and  a  drastic  increase  in  the 
internationalisation  of  productive  and  financial  capital.  In  the  words  of  Hirst  and 
Thompson 
 
[t]he relative internationalisation of economic relations since the 1970s has 
appeared  to  strengthen  the  economic  liberals’  case,  giving  rise  to  the 
widespread belief that global markets are ungovernable. [...] [T]his is far from 
being  the  case,  and,  even  in  a  period  of  economic  liberal  ideological   29 
dominance, structures of market regulation have been built up or maintained at 
the international level. (Hirst & Thompson, 1996: 123) 
 
The  idea  behind  this  argument  is  the  possibility  of  transferring  part  of  the  nation 
state’s  functions  to  other  supranational  state  bodies.  In  other  words,  although  the 
nation  states  may  be  declining  in  their  power/role  in  managing  their  domestic 
economies, new types of supranational states are being created by the dynamics of this 
new capital accumulation process.  
Hirst & Thompson (1996) identify five levels of economic governance in the 
international economy: 1. Governance through agreement between the major nation 
states, particularly the G3 (Europe, Japan and North America); 2. Governance through 
a  substantial  number  of  states  creating  international  regulatory  agencies  for  some 
specific  dimension  of  economic  activity,  such  as  the  WTO
16  to  police  the  GATT 
settlement; 3. Governance of large economic areas by trade and investment blocs such 
as the EU or NAFTA
17; 4. Governance through national-level policies that balance 
cooperation  and  competition  between  firms  and  the  major  social  interests;  5. 
Governance through regional-level policies.  
  The debate on the possibility that internationalisation may weaken the nation 
state as an institution is not new. A number of writers have analysed this issue from a 
political  economy  point  of  view.
18  Although  there  are  important  theoretical 
differences between them regarding the nature and functions of the state (and nation 
state), there is a broad consensus that the nation state may lose/transfer some of its 
functions to other forms of supranational states and thus there might be a reduction in 
its power/role to implement independent national policies. As it was noted in section 
three, the nations states, particularly in developed countries, are an integral part of this 
process. They are the facilitators, rather than the victims. They do respond to the needs 
of  the  capital  accumulation  process  and  do  what  is  required  to  guarantee  the 
reproduction  of  capitalist  social  relations  in  a  changing  environment  by  creating 
                                                            
16 And perhaps the WB and IMF 
17 And many others such as Afta, Efta, Andean Pact, UEMOA, SADC, SAARC, Apec, Mercosur. 
18 Murray (1971), Warren (1971), Rowthorn (1971), Poulantzas (1975), Fine & Harris (1979). See Fine 
& Harris (1979) for a comprehensive exposition and critique of this debate.   30 
supranational  states  and  transferring  significant  powers.  Therefore  this  approach 
radically differs from both hyper-globalists and spectics.        
  There are two important objectives behind the formation of these supranational 
state apparatuses. One is political and the other is more technical. The political one is 
related to the national class structure, which is also carried through to an international 
domain  by  the  internationalisation  of  capital,  which  reflects  the  struggle  between 
workers  and  international  capital,  and  the  struggle  between  different  segments  of 
capital. Given that the nation state fulfils the fundamental role of guaranteeing social 
reproduction, an international state system may also perform a similar function for the 
resolution of international rivalries by organizing cooperation to moderate the effects 
of  the  increased  competition  provoked  by  internationalisation.  ‘In  addition  the 
working  classes  of  all  national  states  can  be  disciplined  and  moderated  in  class 
struggle by the economic control exercised by those bodies, a control that is remote 
from the struggles at the point of production’ (Fine and Harris, 1979: 153). There is, 
then,  an  important  incentive  for  international  capital  to  create  these  supranational 
states, in as much as their inner-rivalries allow.  
  The  technical  objective  is  related  but  separate  to  the  political  one.  As  the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) states, 
 
[…] governments and business must work more closely together, at national 
and  international  level,  to  design  the  multilateral  rules  for  the  worldwide 
marketplace which will be increasingly necessary for the smooth functioning 
and  good  management  of  globalization.  Globalization  is  a  business-driven 
phenomenon, and business has now become a natural partner of governments 
to help them in this task. (ICC, 1997) 
 
Whether it takes the form of trade or FDI, international economic integration is not as 
a result of individual actions of firms and firms neither individually nor collectively 
can manage all the consequences of this dynamic process (Kozul-Wright, 1995: 138). 
Since not all parties benefit equally, the integration process has always been a matter 
of  rivalry  that  seeks  a  resolution  through  negotiation,  consensus  building,  co-
operation,  compliance and intimidation in varying degrees. Internationalisation has 
always  been  a  regulated  process.  ‘[M]arket  economies  need  to  be  appropriately   31 
governed if they are to perform effectively in meeting the substantive expectations of 
a wide range of economic actors’ (Hirst & Thompson, 1996). Thus, appropriate rules 
and  regulations  must  be  established  to  manage  this  complicated  process. 
‘[S]upervisory authorities [should be] created to ensure the process of international 
integration is managed effectively. [...] Ideally, the spread of TNCs needs to be matted 
by  transnational  state  structures’  (Kozul-Wright,  1995:  138).  The  creation  of  such 
institutions is also necessary to reduce transaction costs and to coordinate cross-border 
activity.     
As noted earlier neither internationalisation nor globalisation need to be liberal 
processes. Many writers have rightly argued that the internationalisation of capital 
does  not  necessarily  require  an  association  with  liberalisation.
19  Liberalisation  of 
trade,  for  example,  may  in  fact  stall  the  internationalisation  process  by  creating 
economic, political and social crisis. On the other hand, as some of the East Asian 
countries have undeniably demonstrated, it is possible to stimulate exports through 
state  intervention.  Bairock  &  Wright  (1996)  argued  that  before  WW1,  trade 
liberalisation was not a major factor in the internationalisation process. In fact, ‘rapid 
export  growth  in  this  period  occurred  against  a  tide  of  rising  protection.’
20 
Furthermore Cameron (1978) and Rodrik (1996) affirm a positive correlation between 
the trade ratio and the size of government in economic activity. Evans (1997: 67) 
concludes that ‘a look at the nations that have been most economically successful over 
the last thirty years suggests that high stateness may even be a competitive advantage 
in a globalised economy.’  
The same logic is applicable to globalisation. For example, if one takes the EU 
as a ‘miniature’ form of globalisation, it is obvious that the nation states in the EU 
have  lost/transferred  considerable  power  as  a  result  of  the  integration  process. 
Particularly  in  the  wake  of  monetary  unification,  the  nation  state’s  power  to 
implement independent monetary and fiscal policies has been reduced substantially. 
This reduction of power, however, does not necessarily imply liberalisation. As the 
role of the nation state declines in the EU, another super state is being created. It is 
obvious that the EU does not inevitably require liberalisation and it can implement 
                                                            
19 Weiss (1997 and 1998), Hirst & Thompson (1996), Evans (1997), Bairock & Wright (1996), 
20 Bairock & Wright (1996: 20)   32 
interventionist, or even socialist economic and social policies. Thus, as long as the 
relevant international state structures are created, globalisation does not necessarily 
require liberalisation. The reason why liberalisation is perceived in association with 
internationalisation is the fact that  
 
the best established effective argument for governed and socially embedded 
markets, the theory of the ‘mixed economy’, was developed for national-level 
economic  management.  We  need  a  new  equivalent  type  of  theory  which 
recognizes that many aspects of economic activity are no longer under direct 
national  control  and  that  a  changed  international  environment  needs  new 
strategies and institutions. (Hirst & Thompson, 1996: 123) 
 
The  liberal  ideology  plays  an  important  role  in  this  process.  There  is  an  obvious 
relationship  between  the  structural  changes  in  the  world  economy,  domestic  and 
international class relationships and the dominant ideologies that were produced to 
support them. From this angle the recent rise of the anti-state ideology should be put 
in perspective. Economic theories are ideological constructions and their popularity is 
determined by the dominant processes of capital accumulation. The debates over the 
role  of  state,  and  namely  if the state (or how much state) is required to facilitate 
economic  development,  cannot  be  reduced  to  a  technical  issue.  Thus,  the  recent 
popularity of neoclassical economics should be approached from the viewpoint of its 
ideological base, rather than its intellectual superiority over the alternative structuralist 
and political economy perspectives.   
Globalisation should be seen as an uneven process through time and space. 
Through  time,  as  a  complex  process,  globalisation  will  be  unlikely  to  make 
continuous progress but will experience many upswings and setbacks. It is obvious 
that the creation of supranational states is not a simple matter since ‘international 
capital’ is not a homogenous category and the divergent interests and power structures 
that characterize the international economy are absorbed into the political struggle in 
the process of constructing such institutions. However, the destructive nature of this 
struggle itself necessitates and facilitates this process. For example recent US policies, 
although damaging to globalisation process, may be seen as temporary setbacks.         33 
In the same manner globalisation is an uneven process through space as not all 
countries influence or are influenced by the globalisation process uniformly. Nation 
states  represent  different  segments  of  international  capital  as  a  truly  transnational 
capital yet does not exist. Therefore countries continuously reposition themselves and 
revise  their  policies  in  the  light  of  internal  and  external  circumstances.  The 
discrepancy  between  developed  and  developing  countries  is  particularly  worth 
emphasising. Developed country states, which account for most international capital, 
are active and leading participants in this process, whereas the states of developing 
countries, perhaps with the exception of large and powerful countries such as China, 
India and Russia, are integrated into a process over which they have very little control. 
Most developing countries are marginalized and disadvantaged in this process as they 
have lost considerable power over their own economies. For example, the rules of 
WTO and policies of the Bretton Woods institutions prevent them from implementing 
the industrial policies that all today’s developed countries employed in their earlier 





Arguably  the  internationalisation  of  capital  is  predominantly  a  technical  process 
whereas  liberalization  is  predominantly  a  political  one.  As  we  argued  earlier,  a 
separation  of  these  two  developments  is  essential  to  understanding  the  nature  of 
globalisation  process,  particularly  what  is  permanent  and  what  is  temporary.  The 
internationalisation of capital is a permanent feature of capitalism and expected to 
continue,  unless  there  are  extraordinary  events  like  world  wars  and/or  severe 
international crises. As Robinson (1998) argues such processes cannot be reverted as 
such, as they are not projects conceived, planned and implemented at the level of 
intentionality, but they can be influenced, redirected, and transcended.  
  The big international capital ‘insists on being free to operate on a world stage’ 
(Radice,  1998:  19)  and  prefers  a  liberal  globalisation  process.  Through  a  liberal 
globalisation process, international capital increases its bargaining power over popular 
classes  worldwide.  The  future  of  the  liberalisation  process,  however,  will  be 
determined politically by the ability of its opponents to take up this new challenge and   34 
organise themselves nationally as well as internationally. It has long been argued that 
the  policies  of  the  nation  state  are  in  general  determined  by  ‘the  internal  forces 
generated by class struggle and external forces imposed by international capital and 
class antagonism on a world scale’ (Fine & Harris, 1979: 153).  What is new in this 
process,  however,  is  that  as  its  volume  and  mobility  grows,  capital  increasingly 
engages in production on an international scale and enjoys an unprecedented structural 
power, while labour stays predominantly within national borders. The marginalisation 
of the working classes and their political organisations can partially be explained by 
this phenomenon.     
  There is no doubt that the creation of supranational states has been initiated by, 
and  serves  the  interest  of  international  capital.  The  same  supranational  states, 
however,  create  opportunities  for  the  poor  and  oppressed  people  of  the  world  to 
engage in the political process more effectively. There is a need for progressive forces 
to try to influence the policies of supranational states. Such strategies could take many 
different forms. Although some ‘anti-globalisation’ movements have already emerged, 
the labour movement has been slow in taking up this new challenge. Nevertheless 
there are encouraging signs. For example the collapse of TWO talks in Cancun due to 
resistance by developing countries, could be considered as symbolic and an important 
victory  for  them.  Civil  initiatives  such  as  the  World  Social  Forum  are  promising 
developments in the opposition to neoliberalism and the domination of the world by 
powerful  companies.  As  John  Weeks  (1996)  argues,  regional  integration  could 
potentially  be  a  way  to  regain  policy  autonomy  for  developing  countries  from 
multilateral  organisations.  The  same  logic  can  be  extended  and  interpreted  more 
widely  for  developed  countries  as  well.  Through  regional  integration  or  by  the 
formation of other supranational states, populations in DCs can also regain policy 
autonomy from international capital through working class struggle. Initiatives like the 
UN’s Global Compact, although it has failed to become a code of conduct, could be a 
useful  device  to  control  and  limit  the  damaging  impact  of  MNCs.  Increased 
international  cooperation  and  even  the  unification  of  trade  unions,  for  example 
throughout the EU, could potentially provide an important power base to counter the 
influence of MNCs. In other words, the ability of the labour movement to influence 
supranational  state  policies  will  be  determined  by  its  ability  to  organise  itself 
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